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This article revisits Dolf Sternber 
ger’s 1960 theory, which, in explicit opposition to Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy thesis, 
found the essence of politics and the political in peace. The essay contextualizes 
Sternberger’s propositions by relating them to his immediate post-1945 considerations 
– such as normalizing domestic politics, jettisoning authoritarianism, and laying the 
conceptual foundations for the nascent political science – and thereby reconstructs the 
questions his theory of the political sought to answer. The analysis shows in detail 
how the key elements of Sternberger’s 1960 theory derived from the late-1940s: 
rather than reflecting an already normalized political situation or proposing naïve 
pacifism, Sternberger’s text took political conflicts seriously and provided an outline 
of a desired but only prospective political peace amidst a crisis. Despite substantial 
polarity, Sternberger’s view is largely compatible with Schmitt’s theory once we 
remove context-induced polemics and grave misinterpretations – and carries potential 
for systematic political theorizing. 
 




1. Introduction  
 
In Anglophone discussion, the German political scientist, journalist, and philosopher 
Dolf Sternberger (1907–1989) is primarily known for coining the term ‘constitutional 
patriotism’, which Jürgen Habermas later popularized. Sternberger also combined the 
affection toward the political community with the need to defend the constitution 
against those seeking to overturn democracy by democratic means, thus proposing a 
version of ‘militant democracy’ in post-WW2 Germany.1 Further, Sternberger had a 
central role in the redemocratization of Germany and the establishment of novel 
political discourse, as some Anglophone scholars have noted 2, but his efforts in 
founding postwar German political science remain neglected. The most far-reaching 
part of Sternberger’s work, however, was arguably his theorizing of the nature of 
politics and ‘the political’. After WW2, Sternberger aimed at nothing less than a novel 
conceptualization of politics, and this endeavor culminated in a famous inaugural 
address in Heidelberg in 1960. Published on print the next year, Der Begriff des 
Politischen sought to transcend Carl Schmitt’s classical account of the same name in 
fundamentally altered surroundings.3 Although Sternberger’s theory has occasionally 
been noted in Anglophone scholarship4, it remains neglected in the wider theoretical 
                                                        
1 Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 21-6. 
2 Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold 
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 70-1. 
3 Dolf Sternberger, ‘Der Begriff des Politischen’, [1960], in Schriften IV: Staatsfreundschaft (Frankfurt 
am Main: Insel, 1980), 293-320; Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2002[1927/1932]). 
4 Peter M. R. Stirk, Twentieth-Century German Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006), 141; Jan Müller, ‘Preparing for the Political: German Intellectuals Confront the “Berlin 
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debate on ‘the political’.5 Also Sternberger’s 1978 magnum opus on the three roots of 
politics in Aristotelian community, Machiavellian power politics, and Augustinian 
eschatology, respectively, reasserted similar points with a historical focus, but the 
volume has received little attention outside Germany.6 
 
Particularly the 1960 text merits our critical attention – for two main reasons. First, 
and more systematically, Sternberger’s essay sketched an original theory of the 
political, which took political conflicts seriously without, however, essentializing 
them or losing sight of human communality and sociability. Sternberger offered an 
‘associative’ theory of the political, which also incorporated ‘dissociative’ elements7, 
thus going beyond such absolute dichotomies. Sternberger’s theory also primarily 
addressed domestic politics, and it may provide contemporary political theorizing 
with building blocks more directly applicable than those derived from Schmitt’s 
thought. In reasserting the conflictual dimension of allegedly depoliticized liberal 
politics, contemporary advocates of agonistic democracy, conscious of the irony, turn 
to Schmitt8, although this committed antiliberal-cum-antipluralist provided no 
positive theory of political conflicts within societies, but more or less only stretched 
his ‘realistic’ view of international relations into an allegedly universal theory of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Republic”’, in Political Thought and German Unification: the New German Ideology?, ed. Howard 
Williams, Colin Wight, and Norbert Kapferer (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), 210. 
5 James Wiley, Politics and the Concept of the Political: The Political Imagination (New York: 
Routledge, 2016); Oliver Marchart, Die Politische Differenz: Zum Denken des Politischen bei Nancy, 
Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016). 
6 Dolf Sternberger, Drei Wurzeln der Politik, Schriften II:1-2 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1978). 
7 Marchart, Politische Differenz, 35-42. 
8 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 4-5, 14. 
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political per se. Sternberger’s view of the political as peace-oriented reconciliation of 
political quarrels in domestic-parliamentary and international settings alike, by 
contrast, is not mentioned in these debates – presumably because contemporary 
theorists are not acquainted with Sternberger’s ideas, question his civic orientation, or 
miscategorize him, upon literal-textual reading, as a straightforward proponent of 
pacifism. However, if Schmitt’s categories can be utilized for immanent criticism of 
liberal politics despite their ideological commitments, the same, logically, goes for 
Sternberger. His alternative theory of the political is worth revisiting even if one does 
not share its underlying normative commitments or institutional ramifications or has 
misgivings about his occasionally oversimplifying formulations. 
 
Second, Sternberger’s theory of the political is worth closer analysis not despite its 
context-bound nature and consequent limitations but precisely therefore. On account 
of being intertwined with topical concerns, the text transmits what was at stake for its 
author and German political thought of the era more broadly. The 1960 essay 
highlights how the various notions of the political are contextual formations arising 
from the concrete challenges and debates of their day. I contextualize Sternberger’s 
text in order to increase our understanding of the essay itself and the wider theoretical 
moves and intentions behind it, but also the limitations and relative shortcomings in 
Sternberger’s endeavor, thereby aiming to separate the still useful elements from the 
rest. 
 




The subject matter and aim of politics is peace. We have to, and wish to, seek to 
comprehend the political as the domain of endeavors to establish peace, to 
preserve peace, to guarantee, to protect and certainly also to defend peace. Or, 
to put it otherwise: peace is the political category per se. Or, expressed yet 
differently: peace is the ground and characteristic, and the norm of the political, 
all this at once.9 
 
Because Sternberger’s essay utilized phraseology popularized by Schmitt already in 
the 1920s, it has been read as a reaction against Schmitt – justly, no doubt, in terms of 
both substance and rhetoric. While Schmitt characterized the political with reference 
to the distinction between friend and enemy and linked the political conceptually with 
the possibility of physically destroying the enemy in war, Sternberger rather 
associated it with peace. The polemical intent is evident, but Sternberger’s reasons for 
proceeding by reversing Schmitt’s categories mechanically are less evident. 
Consequently, Sternberger’s aims and the ‘point’ – to use Skinnerian vocabulary – of 
his text are easy to miscomprehend if one only reads the sentences therein. The 
present essay therefore engages in some intellectual contextualization and, on that 
basis, clarifies the meaning and significance of Sternberger’s occasionally enigmatic 
formulations. 
 
Despite its intellectual and rhetorical rigidity, Sternberger’s 1960 text is a fascinating 
condensation of his wider intellectual project in the immediate postwar context. The 
reconceptualization of the political derives decisively from his essays since the mid-
1940s and should be read in this light rather than as a mere one-off polemic with 
                                                        
9 Sternberger, ‘Begriff’, 304-5. All translations are by the author. 
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Schmitt. Reinhard Mehring underscored how Sternberger later reworked his ideas into 
a full-scale theory of civic politics in the constitutional state so that the 1960 text 
served as a ‘program and prelude’ for his subsequent work.10 This, however, 
misconstrues its genesis and incorrectly emphasizes the abruptness of the inaugural 
address. Rather than emerging as abstract statements and overstatements, the key 
propositions in the text were anticipated in Sternberger essayistic and journalistic 
analyses immediately after the war as well as in his various commentaries in 
questions of elections, voting, and parliamentary democracy in the 1950s.11 
 
In the next section, I consider several contextual cues in the text and link them with 
Sternberger’s immediate postwar considerations, thereby reconstructing the questions 
to which his theory of the political was an answer. The section after that engages 
analytically with Sternberger’s argumentation since 1945 and shows how the various 
pieces of the 1960 essay were elaborated in earlier texts. The last substance section 
analyzes the Sternberger/Schmitt opposition and restates the relevance of 
Sternberger’s reconceptualization for systematic political theory. 
                                                        
10 Reinhard Mehring, ‘Bürgerliche statt demokratische Legitimität: Dolf Sternbergers 
Auseinandersetzung um den Begriff des Politischen’, in Metamorphosen des Politischen: Grundfragen 
politischer Einheitsbildung seit den 20er Jahren, ed. Andreas Göbel, Dirk van Laak and Ingeborg 
Villinger (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), 236, 245. 
11 My reading here parallels that in Claudia Kinkela, Die Rehabilitierung des Bürgerlichen im Werk 
Dolf Sternbergers (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), especially 221. Also Friedrich 
Kießling (Die undeutschen Deutschen: Eine ideengeschichtliche Archäologie der alten Bundesrepublik 
1945–1972 [Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012], 296) emphasizes the continuities in Sternberger’s 




2. Contextualizing Sternberger’s moves 
 
Before joining the academy, Sternberger worked as a political journalist and public 
intellectual. In this capacity, he delivered popular radio broadcasts, commenting upon 
contemporary questions but also reflecting upon what politics, in its essence, was. 
These reflections, published as Dreizehn politische Radio-Reden 1946 (‘Thirteen 
Political Radio Speeches 1946’, 1947) significantly anticipate the 1960 essay – both 
in terms of its substantial propositions and its potent style. Many formulations from 
the radio broadcasts also migrated to Sternberger’s academic articles, turning his 
postwar oeuvre into a mixture of nearly technical analysis of electoral systems à la 
Anglophone political science and essayistic, even epigrammatic prose with occasional 
undertones from Jaspersian Existenzphilosophie. Particularly in ‘Macht und Sitte’ 
(‘Power and Mores’, 1948), Sternberger sketched a concept of politics along the lines 
of the radio broadcasts, calling for a comprehensive notion to tie together numerous 
aspects of the emerging political science. His primary research interests in the 1950s 
were parliamentary politics, elections, political parties, government formation, and the 
role of the opposition, and the 1950s essays offer crucial steps toward the 1960 
account. 
 
There are five aspects of the wider context of Sternberger’s theory of the political that 
particularly merit attention before analyzing his arguments in detail. First, 
Sternberger’s search for the political was intimately linked with establishing political 
science as an independent field of study and systematizing its key concepts. 
Sternberger is often mentioned as one of the founding fathers of German postwar 
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political science alongside Ernst Fraenkel, Arnold Bergstraesser, Wilhelm Hennis, 
and others.12 Novel concepts of politics and the political were needed so that the 
emerging discipline would have a shared object of study and a consistent identity. As 
Sternberger noted in the very first sentence of his essay, it was the task of political 
science to seek to ‘comprehend the political’ and to come up with a ‘concept of the 
political’, although this was a mission never to be fully accomplished, and its 
accomplishment would actually spell the end of the field.13 Sternberger had engaged 
with this extensive notion of the political already in ‘Macht und Sitte’ wherein he – 
for the first time – utilized the vocabulary of ‘the political’ rather than ‘politics’, 
asked whether there were specifically political phenomena distinct from juridical, 
economic, social, and moral phenomena, underscored the need for a ‘theory of the 
specifically political’ (Theorie des eigentümlich Politischen).14 
 
The search for the autonomous ‘political’ was launched in language exteriorly similar 
to, and compatible with, Schmitt’s call for a criterion of the political as distinct from 
economy, ethics, esthetics, and related fields.15 Sternberger was by no means alone in 
putting the question in this way, yet jettisoning the Schmittian answers – in fact, this 
was a standard maneuver in postwar political science. For instance the Hamburg-
based political scientist Siegfried Landshut lamented the ‘great and general 
                                                        
12 Wilhelm Bleek, Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 2001), 294-5 
13 Sternberger, ‘Begriff’, 295. 
14 Sternberger, ‘Macht und Sitte: Eine Studie über Politik als Wissenschaft’, [1948], in Lebende 
Verfassung: Studien über Koalition und Opposition (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1956), 13. 
15 Schmitt, Begriff, 26-7. 
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uncertainty regarding the actual content of [the] concept [of the political]’.16 After a 
reference to Schmitt’s concept of the political, Wilhelm Hennis described political 
science as still being amidst a search for its proper subject and spelled out the need in 
contemporary state theory to engage with ‘the problem of the political’ and ‘the 
concept of the political’.17 To ask for the nature of the political, was therefore a matter 
of systematizing the conceptual apparatus in political science and consolidating, and 
partly redrawing, disciplinary boundaries in the social and human sciences. When 
Sternberger identified peace as the domain of the political in his 1960 essay, he did 
not write merely as a political philosopher and essayist, but also as a well-established 
political scientist, institutionally authorized to develop the conceptual categories 
guiding his profession. 
 
This aspect is intertwined with the second contextual aspect, namely Sternberger’s 
explicit attempt to provide a new, philosophically sound and normatively acceptable 
concept of the political to serve the project of rebuilding Germany as a democratic 
polity. This necessitated shedding away the burden of the earlier German tradition of 
political thought in which politics had been conceptualized mostly as struggle for 
power, as the affairs of a strong state, and with respect to the assumption that warfare 
manifested the essence of the state in its purest form. Post-1945 political scientists not 
only faced an academic mission, but also the task of providing theoretical foundations 
                                                        
16 Siegfried Landshut, ‘Empirische Forschung und Grundlagenforschung in der Politischen 
Wissenschaft’, [1956], in Kritik der Soziologie und andere Schriften zur Politik (Neuwied am Rhein: 
Luchterhand, 1969), 307. 
17 Wilhelm Hennis, ‘Politik und praktische Philosophie: Eine Studie zur Rekonstruktion der politischen 
Wissenschaft’, [1959], in Politikwissenschaft und politisches Denken: Politikwissenschaftliche 
Abhandlungen II (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 2, 73. 
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for a democratic and parliamentary order after the complete shipwreck of 
authoritarianism. Correspondingly, the discipline had the self-identity of ‘a science of 
democracy’, seeking to supervise Germany’s redemocratization.18 The endeavor to 
establish political science as an independent field was substantially supported by the 
Anglo-American occupiers who also promoted political democratization.19 
 
Sternberger emphatically advocated a pluralistic, liberal, and civic political order 
based on parliamentary representation, open societal debate, free opinion-formation, 
and regular elections as expressions of the political will of the people rather than as 
mere legitimizing plebiscites. In his attempted breakaway from the authoritarian 
traditions, Sternberger criticized the well-known theories of Clausewitz, Treitschke, 
Bismarck, Weber, Schmitt, and others. Many contemporary thinkers similarly 
recognized the need to shed the authoritarian past. For instance Jaspers explicitly 
noted that the emerging postwar state necessitated ‘a new political mode of 
thought’,20 which could not be ‘the continuation of Prussian political thinking or the 
continuation of thinking in the categories of the nation state’.21 Also Sternberger 
forcefully challenged the inherited conceptual apparatus, which he and his fellow 
reformers saw as having contributed to the impasse of German political analysis as 
exercised in traditional Staatsrechtslehre or by the nationalistically oriented historians 
                                                        
18 Helmut Dubiel, ‘The Acceptance of Democracy: Intellectual and Political Culture in West 
Germany’, in Coping With the Past: Germany and Austria after 1945, ed. Kathy Harms, Lutz R. 
Reuter, and Volker Dürr (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 134.  
19 Greenberg, Weimar Century. 
20 Karl Jaspers, Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung: Über Aufgaben deutscher Politik (Munich: Piper, 
1960), 120. 
21 Ibid., 122. 
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of the previous generation. To avoid the downfall of democracy, like that in Weimar, 
it was paramount to make the ‘highest, simpliest, and most elemental political 
concepts as clear as possible’ so that they would be ‘familiar to everyone’.22 Clarity 
also implied occasional normative reconsideration, particularly that regarding the 
basic concept of politics. There were so many ‘imbecile’ and ‘malicious’ views of 
politics around, Sternberger noted in 1946, that it was small wonder that politics had 
turned ‘murderous’.23 
 
The postwar scholars’ need to ditch the former tradition of political thought guided 
the way Sternberger started asking for the concept of the political – and partially 
prestructured his answers, as is particularly the case with Sternberg’s reading of 
Schmitt. The third contextual aspect is therefore that of general anti-Schmittian 
impulses in German postwar political science. The polemic against Schmitt in 
particular caused Sternberger to formulate his position more categorically than he 
presumably would have done otherwise; this, however, was generational phenomenon 
rather than merely a single unsuccessful debate between two political thinkers. Many 
of Sternberger’s contemporary colleagues took Schmitt as their primary target. Arnold 
Bergstraesser rejected as too simplified the view that politics originated in ‘the 
opposition of friend and enemy’ or that the political would merely reflect ‘the degree 
of intensity of the alliance or distinction between human beings’.24 Landshut similarly 
rebutted Schmitt’s theory as a substantially empty, if not circular, attempt to define 
                                                        
22 Dolf Sternberger, Dreizehn politische Radio-Reden 1946 (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1947 ), 24. 
23 Ibid., 49. 
24 Arnold Bergstraesser, ‘Politik’, [1956], in Weltpolitik als Wissenschaft: Geschichtliches Bewußtsein 
und politische Entscheidung (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965), 186-7. 
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the political community with respect to an existential enemy without specifying what 
would make those within the community existential friends.25 With explicit reference 
to Schmitt, the fellow Heidelbergian Carl J. Friedrich denied that politics was 
‘entirely or even primarily strife and struggle’ or ‘only a matter of identifying the 
enemy’.26 Like Sternberger, his former teacher Karl Jaspers called for a new kind of 
politics, lamenting that ‘old politics’ considered everything from the viewpoint of 
‘friend and enemy’ and ‘with respect to war’, whereas Jaspers’s ‘new politics’ would 
be looking for ‘peace and its presuppositions’ in the reality of the friend/enemy 
distinction.27 Sternberger’s reaction against the Schmittian conceptualization of the 
political, thus, was a part of the postwar thinkers’ opposition to a perceived symbolic 
figurehead of prewar authoritarianism, nationalism, and radical conservatism. The 
very act of offering, at least seemingly, a superior theory to counter the Schmittian 
political was a symbolic gesture and a way of earning one’s spurs in the republican 
sectors of the German postwar academia. 
 
Fourth, to further contextualize Sternberger’s essay, we must note that it was first 
delivered as an inaugural address in the great hall of the university of Heidelberg in 
November 1960. Postwar Heidelberg itself was a symbol of the new beginning of 
intellectual and political life under American rule, highlighting the profundity of the 
process of liberalization and cultural change, going significantly beyond mere 
denafizication, yet also reflecting the challenges therein. The turn toward a more 
                                                        
25 Landshut, ‘Empirische Forschung’, 315. 
26 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1963), 412. 
27 Karl Jaspers, Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen: Politisches Bewußtsein in unserer Zeit 
(Munich: Piper, 1960[1958]), 481-2. 
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liberal outlook took place upon an intellectual ground with numerous deep-lying 
strata. On the one hand, Heidelberg was one of the places where Schmitt’s spirit was 
still ‘clearly alive’28 at the time, and thereby also the ‘center of the scientific dispute 
with Schmitt’.29 Not only the legal scholar Ernst Forsthoff taught there, but also 
several intellectual Schmittians of the next generation, such as Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, Reinhart Koselleck, Nicolaus Sombart, Roman Schnur, and Hanno 
Kesting, studied and worked in Heidelberg. On the other hand, however, Heidelberg 
was known for its liberal and West-oriented athmosphere upheld by Karl Jaspers, 
Alfred Weber, Karl Löwith, Carl J. Friedrich, and others. Sternberger, together with 
Hannah Arendt, had studied under Jaspers. Both younger scholars were forcefully 
influenced by Jaspers’s philosophy of existence, but also Arendt’s early work, partly 
published in Die Wandlung, which Sternberger co-edited with Jaspers and others, 
stimulated Sternberger’s Neo-Aristotelian ideas. Heidelberg was the place where both 
the Jaspersian and the (anti-)Schmittian tones of Sternberger’s essay were the most 
likely to find resonance – or at least an audience capable of detecting these 
undertones. In fact, the essay can be interpreted as an intricate implicit encounter 
between the partly rival, partly co-extensive Schmittian and Jaspersian political 
languages, as I will elaborate later. 
 
Fifth, the 1960 text reflects the wider postwar attempt to switch from crisis politics to 
normal politics. The process of concrete normalization implied a shift of mentality 
                                                        
28 Bernhard Vogel, ‘Dolf Sternberger und die politische Wissenschaft’, in Politikwissenschaft in 
Heidelber: 50 Jahre Institute für Politische Wissenschaft, ed. Arno Mohr and Dieter Nohlen 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 2008), 242. 
29 Dirk van Laak, Gespräche in der Sicherheit des Schweigens: Carl Schmitt in der politischen 
Geistesgeschichte der frühen Bundesrepublik (Berlin: Akademie, 2002), 187. 
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and perspective from the exception, the extreme case, and what in a worst-case 
scenario could be, toward the normal state and the actually existing, toward that 
which should and could be, and toward how the possible and the preferable could be 
institutionalized in the young Bundesrepublik. In constitutional law, Rudolf Smend 
explicitly challenged the Schmittian orientation towards the borderline case.30 The 
Schmittian and Smendian schools came to dominate constitutional law in the early 
Federal Republic – the former school primarily concerned, in Günter’s formulation, 
with ‘the polemical aggrevation of political extreme situations’ and ‘the 
intensification of conflicts’ and the latter guided by ‘a vision of a peaceful normal 
situation characterized by general harmony’ and the eventual ‘resolution’ of 
conflicts.31 Similarly, in political science, several authors consciously initiated a turn 
from pessimistic analyses of extreme ideological contestation into a call for moderate 
civic peace through negotiation, compromise, the equal representation of interests, 
and integration, and constant reintegration, of citizens into the political process. This 
shift had institutional and procedural aspects, on the one hand, but spelled a change of 
mentality and analytical perspective, on the other. 
 
Sternberger was amongst the postwar authors who critically reconsidered the recently 
introduced democratic institutions. Sternberger particularly theorized the election of 
representatives as an inherently meaningful form of political existence and an 
expression of civic mentality rather than a mere technical procedure for government-
                                                        
30 Rudolf Smend, ‘Integrationslehre’, [1956], in Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), 480. 
31 Frieder Günther, Denken vom Staat her: Die bundesdeutsche Staatsrechtslehre zwischen Dezision 
und Integration 1949–1970 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 35. 
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formation.32 These considerations were largely motivated by the experience of the 
Weimar Republic, whose downfall Sternberger attributed partly to its flawed system 
of list-based proportional voting; in order not to produce another Weimar, a simple 
majority rule had to be introduced. Sternberger’s concrete institutional solutions thus 
reflect his general attempt to lay the foundations for a move from the political crisis, 
military occupation, and state of exception toward a stabilized republic with a 
successfully internalized democratic culture. ‘Real political life, always and 
everywhere, consists of strife [Streit] and peace [Frieden], of settlement and contract’, 
Sternberger wrote, proposing particularly simple majority voting as a form of ‘peace 
agreement’ between interests and inclinations.33 Erstwhile nationalist activism was to 
be turned into responsible activity in the ‘peaceful strife of opinions and purposes’, a 
principle best secured by majority voting, which created personal bonds between 
citizens and politicians, rather than by the distance-inducing mechanicality of list-
based elections.34 The emphasis, not on strife or peace, but on strife and peace, which 
we encounter later in Sternberger’s 1960 essay, was thus conceptually prepared in his 
work in the late 1940s and was intimately linked with institutional considerations. 
 
As noted, the turn from the exception and extreme to the normal was, however, not 
merely a shift of normative load, but a turn to an other mode of thought. While 
Sternberger shared many aims and formulations with his erstwhile teacher Jaspers, 
Sternberger’s perspective was significantly more oriented toward the normal case. In 
                                                        
32 Dolf Sternberger, ‘Macht und Ohnmacht des Wählers’, [1947], in Die Große Wahlreform: Zeugnisse 
einer Bemühung (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 60-70. 
33 Dolf Sternberger, ‘Über die Wahl, das Wählen und das Wahlverfahren’, [1946], in Die Große 
Wahlreform: Zeugnisse einer Bemühung (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 17. 
34 Sternberger, Radio-Reden, 68-9. 
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his prewar Existenzphilosophie Jaspers had discussed various kinds of limit situation 
(Grenzsituation) in human life, such as struggle, death, chance, or guilt,35 and he still 
analyzed the political culture of the Federal Republic in similar terms. Especially 
violence or force (Gewalt) was the central limit situation of politics, which, as the 
term indicated, was not a proper part of politics. Yet politics essentially consisted of 
coming to terms with violence, and violence was thereby capable of expressing what 
was paramount in politics and political existence. Violence itself, however, was 
‘suprapolitical’, providing the motivation, which gave political views ‘a structure’.36 
 
Their substantial differences notwithstanding, Jaspers’s conceptualization of the logic 
of politics and violence came close to Schmitt, who linked politics and the political 
with the possibility of the physical destruction of the enemy in war. Even if war did 
not always occur, it was ‘the presupposition, always present as a genuine possibility, 
that determines human action and thought in a characteristic way and thereby 
generates specifically political behavior’.37 For both Jaspers and Schmitt, the eventual 
possibility of violence thus co-formed the political, even when the risk did not 
materialize, and this possibility had existential significance for the political 
community. Both thinkers also agreed that a complete decoupling of politics and 
violence, for instance through the saint-like refusal of self-defence or the utopian 
disappearance of war through global pacifism or world state, would spell the end of 
politics in general.38 
                                                        
35 Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Munich: Piper, 1994[1919]), 229-80. 
36 Jaspers, Atombombe, 57. 
37 Schmitt, Begriff, 34–5.  
38 Jaspers, Atombombe, 63. Schmitt, Begriff, 54. 
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Sternberger’s notion of politics, which was conceptually linked with the prospects of 
peace, was clearly at odds with both above accounts. His 1960 essay can be read as 
manifesting an implicit struggle with the existential perspective of the previous 
academic generation, which rather underlined battle, exception, decision, and other 
limit situations. Amidst the generalized misgivings about Bundesrepublik and the 
ideological confusion of the early Cold War, normalization was the call of the day. A 
proponent of militant democracy, Sternberger was by no means dismissive of the 
potential for overpoliticization and ideological polarization in parliamentary 
democracy, either. He emphasized a sufficient, but not excessive level of political 
conflict as an irremovable part of democratic politics throughout, and his theory of the 
political as peace was by no means pacifistic, utopistic, or naïve. Rather it only had a 
different internal structure, focus, and argumentative strategy. 
 
3. From Politics to the Political: 1945-1960 
 
To fully understand the import of Sternberger’s 1960 text, we must engage with the 
gradual genesis of its key propositions in Sternberger’s postwar work, starting at 
Stunde Null, to see how Sternberger conceptually paved the way for his 
conceptualization of the political in terms of peace. In the following, I will 
disentangle the key elements of this conceptualization and follow their routes across 
the postwar intellectual landscape. I first note some ‘formal’ qualities of Sternberger’s 
concept of politics and, consequently, of the political – in other words analyze what 
kind of a concept he was after and what functions the concept was supposed to fulfill. 
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After this I assess the content of Sternberger’s concept, namely his ideas of peace and 
strife as the key qualifying categories of the political. 
 
The aim here is to show that Sternberger’s notion of the political did not emerge 
abruptly in conditions of established normal politics after hostilities had been 
terminated, a republic founded, and hardships transformed into the optimism of ‘the 
economic miracle’. Rather the central elements of this theory arose from the 
immediate post-1945 military, political, cultural, and economic crisis. By having been 
condensed into Sternberger’s key concepts, the crisis experience still reverberated in 
Sternberger’s argumentation in 1960, although the exterior situation had significantly 
improved. The peace, with reference to which Sternberger theorized the political, was 
thus not an already established and secured peace, self-sufficiently cherised and 
generalized into a supposedly universal criterion for politics, or an idealized peace for 
angels. Rather it was a pragmatic peace, yet to be achieved, and a political peace, 
which was humanly possible only insofar as it was institutionally prepared. 
 
What kind of a concept did Sternberger strive for? First of all, his concept of politics 
was linked with an anthropological theory of the human being, and already this set the 
level of generality for the prospective conceptualization of the political. In his 1946 
radio broadcasts, Sternberger started with the Aristotelian postulate that ‘the human 
being was by nature a political being’.39 In ‘Macht und Sitte’ two years later, he called 
for a new and equally comprehensive concept of politics -- certainly not an idealistic 
Hegelian concept, but ‘a humane concept’, intrinsically tied up with the concrete 
political reality of the day and linked with a theory of the human being. Sternberger 
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was after a concept that could answer the basic question: how was politics possible for 
the human being, or how was it ‘humanly possible’ (menschenmöglich)?40 The basic 
motivation thus continued the explicitly Aristotelian starting points of the radio 
broadcasts. Also the 1960 text posed its fundamental questions in a similar manner: if 
the political was conceptually interlocked with peace, it was necessary to ask what 
peace was and particularly what kind of a peace was possible for, and worth, the 
human being (der Menschen möglich und ihrer wert).41 Given the role of peace as the 
ground of the political, the two questions were in fact but two formulations of a single 
question, and the double possibility of politics and peace captured a significant 
proportion of what it meant to be human in the first place. Like Schmitt’s theory, also 
Sternberger’s concept of the political built upon a specific anthropology – the former 
noting how every genuinely political theory assumed the human being to be evil42, 
whereas the latter rather underscored natural sociability. Content aside, the link with 
anthropology set significant restrictions on where the essence of the political could be 
found: politics was not only an institutional matter or something that could be 
externalized to the state or the ‘system’, but something fundamentally human, and the 
political, accordingly, had to be conceptualized on the same level of generality. 
 
These starting points gave rise to the second key element in Sternberger’s 
reconceptualization: the emphasis of the human being as the primary subject of 
politics and the consequent need for a singular concept of the political which would 
cover both individuals and institutions. Rather than with the great deed of states and 
                                                        
40 Sternberger, ‘Macht und Sitte’, 13, 15-16. Cf. Kinkela, Rehabilitierung, 192. 
41 Sternberger, ‘Begriff’, 307-8. 
42 Schmitt, Begriff, 61.  
 21 
statesmen, Sternberger posited in 1946, politics began with each individual in their 
everyday life and consisted of the conduct and behaving of people among one 
another.43 In 1948, he similarly posited that ‘the human person was the first and last 
subject of politics and the real corps politique’.44 In 1960, Sternberger considered the 
traditional focus on the state in political theory understandable per se, for state was 
the most prominent guarantor of peace; yet only peace as the defining feature of the 
political turned the state into a central political phenomenon, he claimed, thus 
reversing the logic the state and the political vis-à-vis older state theories.45 This was 
also Schmtt’s move in the opening sentence of his essay, proposing that the concept 
of the state presupposed the concept of the political, rather than the other way around, 
as Georg Jellinek amongst others had claimed.46 While Schmitt loosened the 
conceptual link between the state and the political in order to emphasize the autonomy 
of the political, politics, for him, was still a public matter and a question of collective 
existence rather than relying on individuals’ private amities or enmities.47 Sternberger, 
by contrast, widened the scope of the political, based on his earlier conviction that 
there existed only one and single politics, which applied equally to individuals and 
states.48 This served to underline the autonomy of the political vis-à-vis the state, yet 
it also set further restrictions on how the political could be conceptualized, as the 
essence of the political now had to be something common to individuals and states 
alike. This widening move was partially motivated by the context-bound need to, first, 
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deviate from the German tradition and, second, to popularize politics relying on 
strong civic participation and to ‘resell’ it to German citizens, who, after authoritarian 
rule, presumably cherished ideals of unpolitical passivity. To depict politics as 
relevant for people’s everyday life was, in the postwar situation, per se an act of 
democratization, which carried conceptual consequences for Sternberger’s later 
thinking. 
 
Third, Sternberger also reacted against the earlier German tradition of state politics by 
proposing the primacy of domestic politics over foreign affairs.49 The three main 
domains of politics and the political were the everyday life of individuals, (by 
extension) domestic politics, and (by further extension) international relations. In 
1946, Sternberger proposed that in the current conditions of unfreedom and 
occupation, primacy should be given to domestic politics in the widest sense of 
organizing the life of individuals and groups within a community50 and that this kind 
of domestic politics was also the best form of external policy, as it curbed 
authoritarianism and militarism.51 This context-bound primacy of domestic politics 
gave Sternberger’s later theory its particular structure: his was a theory of the 
primarily domestic political, which he then extended upon the interaction between 
states. Schmitt’s doctrine, by contrast, had primarily covered external relations 
between states in an era when Germany was struggling to regain its international 
sovereignty, and he only secondarily and derivatively applied the same principles to 
relations within the state. In fact, Schmitt’s original 1927 essay hardly mentioned 
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domestic politics, whereas for the more widely read 1932 book version Schmitt added 
discussion of civil war, the possibility of which was the criterion for the domestic 
political – a paradoxical phenomenon and utterly uncalled for in Schmitt’s categories, 
as internal enmity implied instability and possible dissolution of the political 
community. In terms of its argumentative logic, Sternberger’s reconceptualization 
proceeded in reversed order. Individuals, human communities, and international 
relations were all to be covered by ‘the political’, which, again, set relatively high 
requirements for the prospective concept of the political. 
 
Fourth, the anthropological premise, discussed above, implied the ubiquity and 
inescapability of the political. Even the presumably ‘non-political laypeople’ were 
‘political beings from morning to night’52 and ‘constantly practiced politics’ 
regardless of whether they noticed this or not.53 There was no escaping politics in 
Sternberger’s sense, although many ‘considered or even declared’ themselves to be 
‘non-political’, as he repeated in a 1946 essay in Die Wandlung.54 The co-editor 
Jaspers equally emphasized the ubiquity of the political: ‘There is nothing in the being 
and deeds of humans which does not also have a political meaning’,55 he noted, also 
stressing the need to comprehend the political (das Politische) ‘as the fate to which 
everyone contributes through action or inaction’.56 Whereas the primacy and ubiquity 
of the Schmittian ‘political’ followed from its conceptual link with the potential of 
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conflict, which could never be completely excluded in real-life politics, the constant 
presence of the Sternbergerian ‘political’ was rather a consequence of the human 
tendency to communal existence and natural sociability, as reflected in his different 
underlying anthropology. 
 
The idea of the ubiquity and inevitability of politics also carried a reference to the 
typically German problem of the unpolitical man – a highly topical consideration in 
the postwar context, when memories of the seemingly unpolitical middle classes 
having paved the way for Hitler were still fresh and those accused of Nazi crimes had 
defended themselves by referring to the allegedly non-political character of their 
backgrounds or activities.57 In this context, the ubiquity of the political implied 
citizens’ inescapable responsibility for what happened around them. Being political 
was thus not only a descriptive category applicable to various objects, but also an 
attribute of individuals and a task they were expected to perform. No one ‘is allowed 
to be ‘unpolitical’, because no one can be unpolitical’, Sternberger reasoned.58 
 
The fifth formal quality of Sternberger’s notion of the political was its inherent 
normativity. He brought politics so close to good politics that this relation turned 
almost definitional, and an unmistakably normative layer of meanings entered his 
conceptualization. In the 1946 radio broadcasts, Sternberger noted that the relentless 
politics of ‘brutes’ and ‘go-getters’ was actually ‘no politics at all’.59 Another 1946 
essay proposed that politics, ‘or to use a different expression, which only means the 
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same: good politics’, was ‘a human affair’ and the ‘task of human beings’.60 His 
relatively more academic 1948 essay, explicitly sketching a concept of politics for the 
recently founded discipline of political science, spelled the normativity point 
explicitly: ‘There are no definitions which would not contain a normative element: to 
define politics is necessarily and straightforwardly to define good politics’.61 The 
formulation reflects Sternberger’s Aristotelian premises. His notion of politics aimed 
to capture not only the de facto existing, but also what in the natural order of things 
would eventually unfold with respect to the inherent telos of the object of definition – 
or, to put that more bluntly, what should be, whereas Schmitt’s conceptualization 
rather aimed at what could be in the extreme case. Predictably, the inherent aim of 
politics was peace62, and politics was good, or politics in the first place, insofar as it 
actualized this telos. 
 
Equipped with these formal characteristics of, and expectations for, Sternberger’s 
prospective concept of the political, let us finally turn to the substantive 
interpretations he proposed. In Sternberger’s 1946 characterization, politics – which 
was synonymous with good politics – consisted of the good conduct and good 
manners, and ‘decency’ (Anstand) was the ‘A and O of politics’.63 Particularly 
democracy was about Sitte (translatable as customs, conventions, or mores) as well as 
social intercourse between humans.64 Consequently, a theory of good manners was 
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also were political science and political theory began and ended65 -- a patently 
overblown formulation, which nevertheless informs us about the starting points of 
Sternberger’s project of disciplinary reconceptualization. Sternberger depicted politics 
as a way of achieving things in human interaction, and one could do this by force and 
conquest, but generally more effectively by more refined means. The above-cited 
formulation that the elbow politics of brutes was actually no politics alluded to the 
international politics of the Third Reich, although Sternberger rather illustrated this 
with reference to a tenant securing their opportunity to play the piano by cleverly 
negotiating with the neighbors and a passenger attaining a seat in a growded tram by 
skillful diplomacy rather than force.66 
 
In a barely concealed retort to Schmitt, Sternberger maintained that anyone who did 
not step aside on crowded tram stairs turned others into enemies – which, for 
Sternberger, served to show how ‘friend/enemy relations were by no means primary 
relations, like a once famous political theorist posited’, but enmity was produced by 
action.67 Good politics was the art of avoiding unnecessary enmities, and, vice versa, 
the concessions inherent in good politics enabled the attainment of goals otherwise 
impossible. ‘Sociable decency’ (geselliger Anstand) made ‘a lot possible’, and in his 
modified version of the Bismarckian dictum Sternberger defined politics as ‘the art of 
the possible within good manners [die Kunst des Möglichen innerhalb der guten 
Sitte]’.68 
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As noted, Sternberger first asked for the specifically political in ‘Macht und Sitte’ in 
1948. However, his proposal remained abstract therein and was still expressed in the 
traditional terms of ‘politics’ rather than ‘the political’. Politics, Sternberger argued, 
was a combination of the substance matter of power relations and the principle of Sitte 
which gave it a form: ‘Politics [is] the civilized use of power [gesitteter 
Machtgebrauch] and – equally – powerful, mighty customs [machtvolle, mächtige 
Sitte]’.69 Also politics as science, Sternberger noted, was therefore more than a 
collection of rules guiding the actions of civilized states, yet also more than merely 
the ‘analysis of relations of power (“friend/enemy relations”)’. Escaping the narrow 
confines of realistic and idealistic theories alike, politics consisted simultaneously of 
both ‘power and custom, custom and power; will and spirit, spirit and will; material 
and form, form and material’.70 Politics as ‘civilized power’ was ‘humanly possible’ 
(menschlich möglich) and ‘humanly necessary’ (menschlich nötig)71, thus fulfilling 
the first conceptual criterion discussed above. 
 
But what, exactly, was it that made such politics political? Sternberger left the 
question unanswered until his 1960 inaugural address. In tracing the the particularly 
political, as opposed to politics, Sternberger first denied that the political could be 
found in mores/customs (Sitte), decisions alone, or the state itself, although the study 
of customs, decisions, or institutional forms as the three main parts of political science 
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often came across typically political phenomena.72 The political was now clearly 
something different than merely a nominalized adjective derived from ‘politics’ as the 
civilized use of power. It had a separate criterion, which Sternberger found in the 
category of peace. In so doing, Sternberger revitalized some of his earlier bold claims. 
In his radio essays almost fifteen years earlier, he had proposed that peace was ‘the 
innate aim [das eingeborene Ziel] of politics’73, that politics was ‘by its very nature 
always the politics of peace’,74 and that the term Friedenspolitik was therefore 
actually a pleonasm.75 In a 1956 reply to Morris Janowitz’s essay, which had 
explicitly asked how one should define the political, Sternberger introduced his idea 
of peace as the subject matter (Gegenstand) of politics and saw social integration as 
an ‘innate [eingeborene] ... human endeavor’.76 Some four years later, peace was ‘the 
subject matter [Gegenstand] and aim [Ziel] of politics’.77 Peace was also closely 
intertwined with the concept of the state, for the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of the state was 
peace, as formulated in 1959.78 While these earlier propositions suggested the 
centrality of peace for all political life, the conceptual identification of the political 
with peace only followed in the 1960 essay. Peace was the ‘the ground [Grund] and 
characteristic [Merkmal], and the norm [Norm] of the political’, and the political was 
to be understood as ‘the domain of endeavors to establish peace, to preserve peace, to 
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guarantee, to protect, and ... to defend peace’.79 As peace was ‘the ground of the 
political’, Sternberger reasoned, world peace was the ‘ground [Grund] and task 
[Aufgabe] of world politics’, and any war that was not waged in order to ‘establish or 
defend peace’, was not a political means, but something else.80 Sternberger never 
formulated the matter quite explicitly, but combined with his previous normative 
points about the politics of brutes not being politics at all, we can conclude that, for 
Sternberger, any politics that was not oriented toward peace was not politics in an 
emphatic sense at all because it lacked the feature that would make it so (that is, the 
political, the characteristic and aim of which peace was). 
 
This principle applied to domestic and external politics alike, and in sketching his 
theory, Sternberger oscillated between the two levels. In the 1946 radio broadcasts, he 
illustrated international politics by comparisons with everyday situations, but hardly 
mentioned domestic parliamentary politics, whereas the 1948 essay covered both. 
Since the mid-1950s, his interest, however, turned primarily to parliaments, elections, 
and parliamentary opposition, and it was in this context that Sternberger developed 
some of the key points that would accompany and specify his 1960 concept of the 
political. Let us therefore briefly note the key points in Sternberger’s theory of 
domestic political strife. 
 
For Sternberger, institutionalized intra-parliamentary opposition served the vital 
functions of critique, control, and providing a political alternative to the government, 
and it could fullfil these functions the better the freer it was from restrictions such as 
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party discipline. Such internalized counter-positioning was beneficial for the whole 
political community in providing what Sternberger called ‘integration through 
polarity’.81 The continued existence of an institutionalized parliamentary opposition, 
however, could not be fully explained with reference to the mere aspect of struggle 
for power (or what Sternberger here called ‘the friend/enemy principle’). He explicitly 
rejected Schmitt’s friend-enemy theory, Gaetano Mosca’s theory of the ruling class, 
and Max Weber’s interpretation of the political in terms of competitive struggle as 
incapable of explaining the ‘astonishing phenomenon’ of parliamentary opposition. 
Neither could the abstract principle of tolerance or the practical necessity to make 
compromises explain why the structure of two groups opposing each other in the 
parliament remained also in cases where one side could permanently suppress the 
other. It would thus be equally mislead to interpret compromising as ‘the fundamental 
category of the political [Grundkategorie des Politischen]’, like unnamed ‘others’ had 
done.82 
 
The point in Sternberger’s 1955 passage was to underline how the perspectives of 
both conflict and compromise were needed to make sense of political phenomena, and 
that the political could not be reduced to either element alone. This was immediately 
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reflected in Sternberger’s conceptualization of political conflict. Not the ‘elimination’, 
but only the ‘regulation of the quarrel’ was needed, as he noted in 1959. It was 
essential to ensure that ‘purely intellectual weapons’ were used – and only this 
‘guaranteed inner peace’ and ‘a pacified society’, which could give rise to a proper 
state, whose essence was peace.83 Similarly, the ‘peace’ with reference to which 
Sternberger defined the political in 1960 was not the absence of conflicts: rather than 
being ‘repelled or precluded, let alone abolished’, quarrel was to be ‘regulated’, taken 
through a process of ‘civilization’, and in fact ‘institutionalized’ into the constitution 
in the form of parliamentary opposition.84 The state was thus ‘the site and area of 
actualized peace’,85 but this peace was essentially a procedural and institutional 
achievement and something to be ‘attained anew every day’,86 rather than a matter of 
wishfully assuming, or even intentionally striving for, the de facto lack of differences 
as a substantial goal. 
 
To better conceptualize the procedural aspect of political conflict, and thereby qualify 
his understanding of politics in terms of peace, Sternberger in 1955 resorted to the 
image of political activity as play or game (Spiel). Although the notion of Spiel is not 
mentioned once in the 1960 essay, it provides the text with an underlying structure 
and makes its key claims more comprehensible. Game or play was closely linked with 
a theory of the political constitution and ‘the theory of the political in general’ 
(Theorie des Politischen überhaupt).87 Institutionalized parliamentary opposition 
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could only be understood in this light: opposition was a form of activity based upon 
respect for the rules of the game, self-regulation of one’s actions, and recognition of 
the adversary as a legitimate and indispensable co-player. It was not necessary to 
‘love the enemies [die Feinde zu lieben]’, but to ‘accept the adversary [Gegner gelten 
zu lassen]’88 as someone to be tolerated rather than annihiliated as soon as this was 
possible. Sternberger was not alone with such views, and here his general theory of 
the political, as reflected also in the 1960s, is inextricably tied with the postwar task 
of rethinking the role of political opposition. Gustav Radbruch and Karl Jaspers, both 
fellow authors of the reformist Die Wandlung journal, used almost identical wordings. 
Radbruch lamented that Germans typically considered their ‘political adversary 
[politische Gegner] either fool or criminal’89 and waged ‘party battle’ like ‘a war of 
destruction against intellectual or moral inferiors’, whereas in reality the political 
opposition was as necessary as the government, and the battle was to be waged ‘only 
with fair means’.90 Jaspers, for his part, noted that ‘the political adversary [Gegner] is 
not an enemy [Feind]’.91 This also applied on the collective level of political parties, 
which were, by definition, always numerous and which endorsed the existence of 
other parties rather than seeking to exterminate them.92 The key programmatic 
proposition by the Die Wandlung authors was to transform the destructive political 
hatred based on irreconcilable world-views into productive democratic contestation. 
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4. Sternberger and Schmitt: Controversy and Compatibility 
 
As shown above, Sternberger’s theory of the political, despite its emphasis on peace, 
was far from a categorical pacifistic rejection of conflict; rather he offered a theory of 
regulated political strife, aiming at the ‘normalization’ of German domestic politics. 
How, exactly, did this relate to the apparent counter-theory proposed by Schmitt in 
the 1920s? In his attempt to jettison the ideological burden of German political 
thought, Sternberger looked on Schmitt with scorn, for instance dubbing him ‘a once 
famous political theorist’, as noted, and Schmitt’s theory clearly prestructured 
Sternberger’s way of asking and answering questions regarding the political. That 
Sternberger’s essay was a ‘retort’ to Schmitt,93 is clear, and the counter-position 
recurs in scholarship with varying strengths. Jan-Werner Müller notes how Schmitt’s 
concept of the political ‘came to haunt West German political science’ and that 
particularly Sternberger ‘tried to wrest [Schmitt’s] concept’ by defining the political 
in terms of peace.94 Kai Burkhardt labels Sternberger as ‘one of Schmitt’s 
archenemies after 1945’.95 While these characterizations are certainly correct, the 
Sternberger/Schmitt opposition is easy to overstate and tacitly transform into the quite 
different proposition that their respective theories were logically or conceptually 
incompatible. For instance Claudia Kinkela notes how Sternberger’s ‘definition of 
peace as the key characteristic of the political is directed against Carl Schmitt’s 
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friend-enemy-relation and against the image of civil war, which is the negation of the 
civic notion of politics’ and speaks of ‘Sternberger’s and Schmitt’s substantially 
irreconcilable counter-positions’.96 Also Peter Schneider concludes that Sternberger’s 
and Schmitt’s respective concepts of the political ‘exclude each other’.97 
 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the two theories are not quite as mutually 
exclusive as these formulations would have us belief. Jörg Pannier finds common 
ground for instance in both thinkers’ belief in politics as fate and usefully hints that 
Sternberger and Schmitt may not be genuine antagonists after all98, without, however, 
analyzing the compatibility with regard to their respective concepts of the political. 
When we assess the conceptual logic of each theory, extensive formal compatibility 
surfaces, despite obvious and extensive disagreement with regard to human nature and 
language, the role of sovereignty in politics, the prospects of parliamentarianism, and 
other differences in their overall thinking. The conceptual opposition regarding the 
political has to be read contextually: it seems that the context-induced polemic against 
Schmitt, deriving from the rupture of 1945 and concomitant intellectual needs, caused 
Sternberger to formulate his own position, on the textual level, more categorically 
than would have suited his own argumentative ends. 
 
In my interpretation, the polemic style of Sternberger’s theory derived from his 
intellectual debt to Jaspers, a proponent of highly polarized conceptual structures. 
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Jaspers for instance opposed -- without intermediating compromises, as he explicitly 
noted -- the principles of totalitarianism with political freedom99, suggested a non-
compromising either-or of ‘political freedom’ or ‘unpolitical brutality’100, and 
contrasted ‘force/violence’ with ‘shared basic motives of being human’.101 For 
Jaspers, war and peace were equally opposable, and the reversal of the perspective 
from war to peace spelled eo ipso the ‘transformation of the old to the new 
politics’.102 Jaspers’s schematic categorization, I propose, also guided the rhetoric of 
Sternberger’s theory in general and particularly its polemical anti-Schmittian thrust. 
As Schmitt belonged to the Jaspersian old politics, oriented towards war, violence, 
and totalitarian brutality, Schmitt’s notion of the political, logically, had to be 
reversed and redefined in terms of its counterconcepts in order to pave the way for 
peace, reason, and freedom which characterized ‘new politics’. 
 
As a political-theoretical counter-statement to Schmitt, Sternberger’s theory, however 
is less than adequate: it contained argumentative errors and, like many other impatient 
reactions to Schmitt, relied on a partial misrepresentation of Schmitt’s positions rather 
than an examination of Schmitt’s actual arguments. This made Sternberger’s text 
easily refutable from the Schmittian perspective. Schmitt never replied directly, but in 
a review of Sternberger’s essay, Rolf Hinder offered an exemplary Schmittian 
rebuttal. Hinder claimed, first, that Sternberger’s notion by no means excluded war 
but rather retained war as a possibility and an inevitable opposite of his cherished 
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peace; second, that Sternberger dismissed the fact that most wars were justified with 
reference to peace, and this was precisely why the problem of just wars, rather than 
being solved, emerged in the first place; third, that by making the orientation toward 
peace the definitional criterion of the political, Sternberger made both war and politics 
dependent on normative considerations which made them susceptible to 
ideologization and thereby actually provided a ‘discriminating’ concept of war of 
precisely the sort that Schmitt saw as the source of the modern ideologization and 
totalization of war; and, fourth, that Sternberger’s conceptualization not only moved 
within the logic of friend and enemy he apparently opposed but also intensified and 
climaxed it.103 These counterarguments were expectable, but – from the Schmittian 
perspective and within that language game – devastating. 
 
However, Sternberger’s failure also in the eyes of those who did not move within the 
Schmittian framework was ultimately sealed by his accumulating argumentative 
errors. Contrary to Sternberger’s suggestions, Schmitt never claimed that war was the 
goal or aim (Ziel) of politics – in fact, he explicitly denied this. War, in Schmitt’s 
scheme, was ‘definitely not the aim [Ziel] and purpose [Zweck] or the content [Inhalt] 
of politics’, but rather ‘the presupposition (that is always present as a genuine 
possibility) that determines human action and thought in a characteristic way and 
thereby generates specifically political behaviour’.104 In Schmitt’s distantly 
Clausewitzian theory105, war was the ultima ratio of politics, but never an end in itself. 
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Schmitt explicitly rejected the belligerent view by Ernst Jünger and others in favor of 
what he called ‘the political’ view, according to which wars were ‘meaningfully 
waged for the sake of peace’.106 If he aimed at Schmitt, Sternberger thus shot wide off 
the mark with his elaboration that wars were Clausewitzian political means only when 
waged for either bringing about or defending a peace.107 There was nothing Schmitt 
would not have accepted here, and neither did Sternberger’s proposition that peace 
was the aim of politics actually reverse anything in Schmitt’s original 
conceptualization of war as a political phenomenon with peace as its goal. The actual 
disagreement was one regarding the normative implications, such as the 
(un)acceptability of war, what price should be paid for peace, or what constituted the 
genuinely political aspect of politics; but the apparent substitution of ‘peace’ for ‘war’ 
in the discussion of the aims of political wars provided no access to the core of the 
controversy. Sternberger’s definition of the political relied on a somewhat mechanical 
reversal of what he took to be Schmitt’s arguments on war rather than of what Schmitt 
had actually said, which tilted the scales decisively in Schmitt’s favor. 
 
In 1960, Sternberger further noted against Schmitt that the essence of the state could 
be derived from proscription or civil war just as little as the essence of marriage was 
derivable from divorce.108 The point, although perhaps rhetorically persuasive, relied 
on earlier flawed argumentation. In 1948, Sternberger posited that the core substance 
of politics was power, while customs/mores provided the form. In some respects, 
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politics was like a marriage, which also contained power relations, yet it would be 
absurd, Sternberger claimed, to define marriage on this basis, as this would imply that 
the aim (Ziel) of marriage was divorce. It was equally impossible to consider the 
friend/enemy relation as the fundamental category of the political, for this would 
‘inavoidably’ imply the absurdity that ‘the aim [Ziel] of politics was war – war, which 
abolishes politics!’109 Here Sternberger, however, projected upon Schmitt his own 
assumptions hardly shared by Schmitt. In Sternberger’s Aristotelian framework it 
made sense to see peace as both the essence and the aim of politics, for essence and 
aim coincided in telos-oriented thought. The logic of Schmitt’s theory, however, was 
rather more Hobbesian, Hegelian, and Clausewitzian. He did not consider war per se 
as the essence of politics, but rather the core phenomenon in politics was the 
existential enmity and the friend/enemy distinction, which in some cases led to war; 
and war was not an essence of politics in the sense of being its key substance, either, 
but only a characteristically political feature. Even less did Schmitt see such a 
hypothetical essence as logically implying that war would be the aim of politics. 
These were rather Sternberger’s own Aristotelian categories that were selectively 
filled with quasi-Schmittian content and, expectedly, became absurd. Also the further 
assumption that war abolished politics is sensible only with respect to Sternberger’s 
own redescription of politics in terms of peace, but posed no logical problem to 
Schmitt: with Clausewitz, Schmitt maintained that all sensible wars contained a 
political element, which shaped warfare throughout, and, far from being abolished by 
war, politics guided war toward the eventual peace. War for war’s sake was 
something else than a form of politics. In his postwar need to gain distance toward the 
German power state and military tradition, and in order to underscore his own peace 
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orientation, Sternberger ended up projecting more militaristic valuations upon his 
opponent that Schmitt’s actual arguments allow for. 
 
In the 1980s Sternberger revised his theory with points remarkably reminiscent of 
Schmitt’s position, now noting that ‘political war’ was in fact possible, that it was 
identical with non-total war, and that military planning was ‘political’ insofar as it 
strove to either avoid war altogether or achieve peace by limited warfare.110 Schmitt 
had been arguing that the role of political wars was to prevent the totalization of 
warfare into crusades and enable limited duel-like confrontations in which the enemy 
would be respected rather than destroyed111 – a theory which Sternberger summarized 
in an appendix to his 1960 essay, without, however, observing the parallels with his 
own considerations, including not only the question of ‘political war’ but also the call 
for chivalry respect of the adversary. Schmitt’s argument that the political nature of 
war, beyond any judicial or moral regulation, secured the ‘bracketing’ of war, may 
have been logically flawed, empirically optimistic, or driven by dubious ideological 
motives to justify war, but in terms of the conceptual logic of the political no major 
deviation is perceivable here. 
 
In 1960, Sternberger operated with the general concept of peace without further 
qualifications. It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that Sternberger re-
engaged with the question of the political and peace in a more nuanced manner and 
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specifically analyzed the relationship between the two concepts – in so doing bringing 
his theory yet closer to Schmitt’s. There were several rival notions of the political, he 
proposed, stemming from different eras and traditions, particularly the Aristotelian 
politological notion, the Machiavellian demonological notion, and the Augustinian 
eschatological notion, and, correspondingly, there were also three kinds of peace.112 
Sternberger restated his 1960 notion of the political without alterations, albeit 
underlining how not only peace was the essence of politics, but also politics was the 
essence of peace, for true peace could be attained by political and institutional means 
alone.113 He was after a this-wordly peace that was both ‘necessary and possible’ for 
human beings – note the unchanged formulation, deriving from the 1948 depiction of 
civilized power as humanly possible and necessary –, and this could only be a 
‘political peace’ of agreement, covenant, and settlement of competings interests, not 
an eschatological peace of salvation or a demonological peace dictated by force.114 
True peace was always ‘a precarious and endangered situation’ and something that 
necessitated politics, as Sternberger noted against antipolitical peace movements. 
Because of similar eschatological overtones, Sternberger now also rejected the 
postwar premise of his ‘great teacher’ Jaspers that the atomic age necessitated a 
fundamental spiritual transformation of the human being. In addressing the humanity 
as a singular whole rather than a plurality, and in calling for an ethical turn (Kehre), 
such a demand operated outside politics. No Jaspersian ‘new politics’ could be 
achieved.115 Given his own postwar activity in promoting such a change in the journal 
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Die Wandlung (‘Transformation’), Sternberger was here reconsidering the 
argumentative and rhetorical basis of his own 1960 polemics. Reckoning 
simultaneously with both Jaspers and Schmitt, Sternberger gradually forwent the 
former’s normative dualisms and suprapolitical ethical pathos in favor of the 
consistently autonomous political and recognition of the limits of human 
achievement, distantly reminiscent of the latter, thus streamlining his underlying 
conceptual framework, albeit still conceptualizing the political differently than 
Schmitt in terms of substance. 
 
A further source of confusion was that, in his original polemical reversal of Schmitt, 
Sternberger linked the political conceptually with actual rather than potential peace. A 
more careful reading would have revealed Schmitt’s characterization of the political 
in terms of the possibility of war (either war between states or civil war). War did not 
have to actualize in order to be politically significant, but it had to be genuinely 
possible. Contrary to what Sternberger claimed in 1946, Schmitt thus did not derive 
the essence of the state from civil war, but he derived the essence of the domestic 
political from the possibility of civil war, as Sternberger quite correctly noted in a 
1961 appendix to his essay, also directly citing Schmitt’s formulation of this 
possibility, yet without particularly emphasizing it.116 The original essay, however, 
makes no mention of this. 
 
This is important, because not only the (in)correctness of Sternberger’s reading of 
Schmitt but also his ability to utilize Schmittian conceptual logic in support of his 
own, radically different substantial conceptualization of the political hinges upon the 
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possibility point – as does our ability to transcend the level of original mundane 
quarrels and use elements from both Schmitt’s and Sternberger’s views for systematic 
concept-building in political theory. I will conclude the section by suggesting 
Schmitt’s dissociative concept of the political with Sternberger’s associative concept 
and showing that these notions are extensively compatible and can be, if desired, 
utilized together for systematic conceptualization of the political. 
 
Had Sternberger engaged with the proposal that the political related to the possibility 
of international war or civil war and reversed that idea, he would have come closer to 
a theory suiting his own postwar argumentative needs – a definition of the political as 
restricted conflict, leaning on the idea that the situation was political – and that 
conflicts were to be tolerated – insofar as, and only as long as, peace was a genuine 
possibility. When oppositions were so intense that peace, agreement, and compromise 
with the adversary were no longer possible, the situation ceased to be political in the 
emphatic sense and turned into something else. 
 
Put together, the above elements would make up the admittedly mechanically but at 
any rate correctly inverted form of Schmitt’s theory. Perplexingly, Sternberger in fact 
suggested such a revised version, relying on potential rather than actual peace – albeit 
only in the 1980s and without much elaboration. In a public engagement with 
Schmitt’s legacy immediately after his death, Sternberger wrote: ‘In oppositions of 
power, interests, attitudes toward life, [or] organizing principles, the political consists 
of the possibility of negotiation, contract, agreement, in short: of peace. Wherever this 
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possibility perishes, ‘the political’ itself is destroyed’.117 Sternberger had presumably 
realized the problems in his reading of Schmitt and tacitly adjusted his vocabulary; he 
never elaborated the consequences, though. 
 
So far also scholarship has overlooked this crucial change and the associated political-
theoretical potential. Jörg Pannier cites the passage in his extensive treatment of the 
Sternberger/Schmitt relation, yet he does not emphasize the element of potentiality at 
all.118 Peter Schneider arguably misconstrues the logics of both theories in claiming 
that the above passage implies that Schmitt’s and Sternberger’s respective concepts of 
the political ‘exclude each other’.119 Especially the modified 1985 version rather 
seems to have extensive common ground with Schmitt’s theory. For Schmitt, the 
situation is political whenever war is genuinely possible, whence it follows that only 
the utopian condition of perfect peace is non-political; for Sternberger, by contrast, 
the situation is political whenever peace is genuinely possible, which only excludes 
the condition of totalized and self-purposeful wars of destruction; between these two 
excluded alternatives, there remains an extensive area of conditions which would be 
‘political’ in light of both criteria. Schmitt and Sternberger looked at the overlapping 
area from opposite directions, the former focusing on the intensification of enmity 
into war, while the latter theorized the de-escalation of conflicts into relative peace. 
Schmitt’s and Sternberger’s political philosophies, obviously, built upon differing, 
perhaps outright incompatible or even incommensurable premises stemming from the 
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former’s reading of Hobbes, Hegel, de Maistre, and others, and the latter’s 
modernized Aristotelianism. These theories also had different normative ramifiations, 
reflecting the authors’ dissimilar value priorities. Yet, the two concepts of the political 
that arose out of this theorizing are not mutually exclusive in conceptual and logical 
terms. Further political theorizing is needed to construct a Schmittian-cum-
Sternbergerian concept of the political and to show its supposed utility for 
conceptualizing modern democratic politics; this article refrains to the particularly 
intellectual historical task of having suggested the compability despite rhetorical fire 




Sternberger’s key contribution for political theory is to have theorized the 
‘associative’ and peace-oriented criterion of the political in a most challenging 
historical situation. On a merely textual reading, one could interpret his 
conceptualization as reflecting the already pacified and normalized political situation 
at the turn of the 1960s and offering a clear-cut counter-position to Schmitt’s theory 
which rather emerged out of the ideological polarization in the late Weimar Republic. 
More contextual analysis, however, suggests that Sternberger’s concept of the 
political arose out of the immediate post-1945 instability and the consequent need for 
political normalization, thus providing the outline of a desired but yet only 
prospective peace.  
 
Experiences of military occupation and loss of sovereignty, nation-wide economic 
crisis, continued lure of authoritarianism, and the threat of antidemocratic forces 
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overturning democratic parliamentarianism from within were not confined to the 
interwar era alone, but were most acutely present when Sternberger embarked on his 
quest for the political. This experience, coupled with the demand for systematic 
conceptual basis for the nascent political science and the need to repel the tradition of 
authoritarianism and militarism, largely determined the way Sternberger asked the 
question of the political – and prestructured the potential answers. Despite its surface-
level polemics with Schmitt’s notion, Sternberger’s theory actually covers much of 
the same ground, albeit with differing conclusions. Once we clear out intentional 
miscomprehension and other context-induced trivialities, Sternberger’s concept of the 
political serves as a potential building block for contemporary theorizing: first, in its 
commitment to constitutionally guaranteed civic participation and explicit rebuttal of 
totalitarianism, Sternberger’s concept offers most of the advantages of Schmitt’s 
corresponding concept without the ideological baggage therein; second, it is directly 
applicable in constructive theorizing of the domestic, democratic, and parliamentary 
political rather than merely the authoritative suppression thereof; and, third, far from 
being naïvely pacifistic, it takes seriously both political conflicts and their regulation, 
both strife and peace – doubtless an assett in the tumultous political landscape of 
contemporary Europe. 
 
 
